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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
the person harmed requires that the defendant shall pay for the loss. "It
can scarcely be said that there is less of a moral point of view involved
in the rule that one who innocently causes harm should make it good. '49
Furthermore, there is a broader sense in which fault means nothing more
than harm inflicted by an innocent defendant who could not help his
actions.50 It would appear that the interest of society as a whole would
be better served by imposing liability upon the unconscious driver just
as we do with the insane. The moral aspects are the same; the situation
is the same; only the labels are different. The renunciation of the con-
ventional fault doctrine in the unconscious motorist situation is not the
abandonment of an ideal, "It is but a new recognition of a human limi-
tation."51
CHRISTOPHER NARDi
Tort Liability of a Landlord Out of
Possession and Control
The liability of a landowner for injuries to person and property
occasioned by the defective condition of the premises is largely dependent
upon whether the landowner -is in control of .the land. With the wide-
spread use of leases in business and residential transactions, it becomes
important to determine under what circumstances a landlord who is out
of possession may be held liable. It has been stated that "Liability in
tort is an incident to occupation or control,"' but "control" has different
meanings depending upon who is the plaintiff. Accordingly, this note
will consider the landlord's liability to tenants, trespassers, licensees, in-
vitees, and strangers, i.e. persons who are not on the premises at the time
of injury.
If any general rule may be formulated, it is that the landlord is not
liable for defects arising after the lease, but that he may be liable if the
defect arose prior to the time of leasing. This dividing line between lia-
bility and non-liability is not limited to the original lease - a landlord
may be liable if a defect existed at -the time the lease was renewed. It
should also be noted that ownership of the land is immaterial because a
tenant out of possession and control is classified as a landlord out of
possession and control.5
" Id. at 318.
' See Isaacs, Fault and Liability, 31 HARV. L. REV. 954 (1918); ct. Smith, Tort and
Absolute Liabdity, 30 HARV. L. REV. 241 (1916-17).
' Isaacs, supra note 50.
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COMMON PROBLEMS
Regardless of the status of the plaintiff, -there are three problems
which are common to the cases: the "common hallway," -the negligent
making of repairs 'by the landlord and the statutory cause of action.
Ohio has long adhered to the rule that the landlord will be liable for
defects which exist on a portion of the premises that is used in common
by several tenants, the rationale being that the landlord is the only per-
son with overall authority to control this common area.4 But while
this is well-established, courts have frequently had difficulty determining
whether the rule was applicable.
In a case involving a tenant who leased the entire premises, the lease
agreement provided that -the window sash should 'be part of the outside
of the building; this provision was sufficient to establish the liability
of the landlord to a -person who was injured by the falling window sash
as he walked past the building.5 If several tenants had occupied the
building and there had been no lease provision, it seems that the Ohio
Supreme Court would have considered the outside of the building as
being used in common by all the tenants. However, a subsequent ap-
pellate case took a different stand with respect to a -grating which was
attached to the outside of the tenanes window.0  The dissenting judge
recognized that the Supreme Court case was not controlling because the
lease was silent as to whether the grating should be considered as part
of the outside or the inside of the .tenant's rooms. He argued that the
face of a 'building should not be divided into 'individual areas, the
liability for each area hinging upon which tenant is in control of the
interior. Certainly, the outside walls, as well as the roof, of a building
which is leased -to several tenants should be considered as being used in
common by all the tenants.1
A porch running across the rear of the dwelling has also been
cause for variance of opinion. Despite the absence of a dividing railing,
'Cardozo, in Cullings v. Goetz, 256 N.Y. 287, 176 N.E. 397 (1931). This state-
ment was approved in Berkowitz v. Winston, 128 Ohio St. 611, 193 N.E. 343
(1934).
'Annot., 49 A.L.R. 1418 (1927). Coward v. Fleming, 89 Ohio App. 485, 102
N.E.2d 850 (1951) (Dicta).
'Youngstown v. Peters, 60 Ohio App. 247, 20 N.E.2d 538 (1937).
'Davies v. Kelley, 112 Ohio St. 122, 146 N.E. 888 (1925).
'Friedl v. Lackman, 136 Ohio St. 110, 23 N.E.2d 950 (1939).
'Rotte v. Meierjohan, 78 Ohio App. 387, 70 N.E.2d 684 (1946).
'In Prendergast v. Ginsburg, 119 Ohio St. 360, 164 N.E. 345 (1928), the roof of
the building was held to be used in common by tenants, each of whom leased part
of the premises.
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such a porch has been held not to be used in common,8 although a case
with similar facts reached an opposite conclusion.9 When a tenant was
injured on the portion of an outside stairway which led only to her
apartment, the court of appeals, over a strong dissent, held that the
stairway lost its common character when the tenant passed the landing
adjacent to the apartment of the first floor tenant.10 If this were an in-
terior stairway with a door at the bottom of the stairs, the majority
opinion would be dearly correct. Bit it is more in accord with the
public's thought process to regard open stairways, whether outside or
inside, as a unified whole which is used in common, not as a network
of private passageways. The Ohio Supreme Court dismissed the land-
lord in a case which involved a stairway leading only to the tenant's
premises," but it has not been confronted with the problem of a com-
mon stairway which allegedly loses its common character when only one
tenant's doorway remains ahead of the person using the stairs. How-
ever, an appellate court, faced with a problem concerning a side hallway
which led only to one tenant's premises, treated the question of the land-
lord's liability just as if .the injury had occurred in the main hallway.' 2
Many of the imponderables in these "common hallway" cases could be
avoided by a clause in the lease which specified the limits of the leased
premises; in the past, the delineation has generally been left to the courts.
The second common problem is that of -the landlord who, while out
of possession and control, makes repairs in a negligent manner. The
Restatement of Torts takes the position that the landlord will be liable
if 'he attempts to make repairs or if his negligent workmanship renders
the premises more dangerous.13 Thus it would seem that if there is an
element of reliance, the landlord will be liable even if the premises are
not in a worse condition than they were before he attempted to repair.
There have been no Ohio cases directly on this point, but it has been
held that the plantiff is not justified in relying on a promise of the
landlord that 'he will repair the defect.14 Ohio cases have followed the
'Kline v. Rider, 48 Ohio L.Abs. 1, 73 N.E.2d 378 (Ct. App. 1947).
9 Reynoldsv. Cherrington, 45 Ohio L.Abs. 564, 68 N.E.2d 136 (Ct. App. 1943).
"0 Bowman v. Goldsmith Bros. Co. 63 Ohio LAbs. 428, 109 N.E.2d 556 (Ct. App.
1952).
'Pitts v. Cincinnati Metropolitan Housing Authority, 160 Ohio St. 129, 113 N.E.2d
869 (1953).
"Roberts v. Fulton, 24 Ohio C.C.R.(n.s.) 233 (1916).
"REsTATEmENT, TORTS § 362 (1934).
1 4Minneker v. Gardiner, 47 Ohio App. 203, 191 N.E. 793 (1933); Himelreich v.
Sams, 16 Ohio L. Abs. 27 (Ct. App. 1933); Ewing v. Webb, 13 Ohio L.Abs. 162
(Ct. App. 1932); Ward v. Dan Cohen Realty Co., 30 Ohio Op. 469 (C.P. 1945);
Schradski v. Butler, 22 Ohio Dec. 701 (C.P. 1911); Marlow v. Shiffman, 9 Ohio
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view of the Restatement -that if the landlord has made the premises
more dangerous,15 he will be held liable despite the fact that his act
of making repairs was purely gratuitous. 16
One Ohio court of appeals case raised the question of how extensive
the repair work must be.'7  The landlord had made some repairs to a
rear porch two months before the plaintiff was injured, and this was
sufficient misfeasance to hold the landlord liable. However, the dissent-
ing judge pointed out that the landlord had repaired another part of
the porch, not the part which caused the plaintiff's injury. Such a hold-
ing could certainly be justified on a "reliance" theory if the landlord
repaired one floorboard and left its neighboring floorboard in a defective
condition. On the other hand it would be difficult to say that a land-
lord who repaired a floorboard on a porch would be liable to a tenant
who was injured by a defective railing. Yet the holding of this appellate
case might be said to justify imposing such liability.
The third common area of discussion is that of the statutorily-created
cause of action. Any of the common law rules regulating -the landlord's
liability may 'be changed by statute,1 8 but Ohio courts are not quick to
imply a change in the common law rules.19 The greatest difficulty has
'been experienced with statutes or ordinances which provide -that, MThe
owner or operator shall, etc." Several lower court cases have held that
such wording ;rposes statutory liability on the landlord out of posses-
sion and control,20 but the Supreme Court has adopted the better view
N.P.(n.s.) 533 (C.P. 1909), aft'd. 18 Ohio L.Rep. 209 (1911). Contra, Union
Trust Co. v. Johnson, 42 Ohio App. 301, 182 N.E. 137 (1931).
' Chapman v. Park Lane Villa Co., 62 Ohio L.Abs. 1, 105 N.E.2d 659 (Ct. App.
1951); Verplanck v. Morgan, 55 Ohio L.Abs. 574, 90 N.E.2d 872 (Ct. App. 1948);
Ballato v. Industrians Savings and Loan Co. 64 Ohio App. 339, 28 N.E.2d 789
(1940); Marshall v. Pewter, 21 Ohio L.Abs. 511 (Ct. App. 1936); Honnemeyer v.
Fischer, 27 Ohio C.C.R. 8, 17 Ohio CC. Dec. 8 (1905).
Chapman v. Park Lane Villa Co., 62 Ohio L.Abs. 1, 105 N.E.2d 659 (Ct. App.
1951); Verplanck v. Morgan, 55 Ohio LAbs. 574, 90 N.E.2d 872 (Ct. App. 1948).
1 Johnson v. Dumech, 52 Ohio L.Abs. 161, 82 N.E.2d 297 (Ct. App. 1948). See
also, Kline v. Rider, 48 Ohio L.Abs. 1, 73 N.E.2d 378 (Ct. App. 1947) where the
court casually made the distinction without comment.
' Stackhouse v. Close, 83 Ohio St. 339, 94 N.E. 746 (1911); Branham v. Fordyce,
103 Ohio App. 379, 145 N.E.2d 471 (1957).
' In Tair v. Rock Inv. Co., 139 Ohio St 629, 41 N.E.2d 867 (1942), an ordinance
provided, "Every tenement house ... shall be maintained ... in good repair ... "
The court said that this did not change the common law rule of non-liability. A
statute imposing liability upon "any owner of any factory," was held not to be appli-
cable to the owner of the building in the case of Lee v. Smith, 42 Ohio St. 458
(1884). See also, Stanforth v. Smith, 79 Ohio App. 158, 71 N.E.2d 738 (1946).
"Bevan v. Century Realty Co., 64 Ohio App. 58, 27 N.E.2d 777 (1940), dism'd
136 Ohio St. 549, 27 N.E.2d 148 (1940); Doster v. Munn, 57 Ohio App. 157, 12
NE.2d 781 (1937); Wilson v. Saalfield, 45 Ohio App. 484, 187 N.E. 323 (1933).
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that such language is too ambiguous to imply a legislative intent to
abolish well-established rules of non-liability.2 ' At least, it is clear that
contributory negligence is a defense and that the plaintiff is estopped if
he knew of the defect, even if he did not know that it was a violation
of a statute or ordinance.22
LIABILITY TO TENANTS
The general rule is that the landlord is not liable to his tenant for
injuries to ,the -tenant's person or property. In an earlier Supreme Court
case the court said, "If the owner does not agree with the lessee to put
the property in good repair or to keep it in good repair the lessee can-
not recover from the owner damages for an injury sustained by the
lessee due -to the defective condition of the property."23 However, later
Supreme Court cases established that the landlord would not be liable
for a defect which occurred during the lease, even if he covenanted to
keep the premises in repair.24 Since liability in tort is predicated upon
control, these later holdings appear to be the better rule. The Supreme
Court has defined "control of the premises" as, ". .. the power and the
right to admit people.. . and to exclude people ....,25 So it is obvious
that the fact that the landlord has covenanted to repair does not place
him in "control" of the premises.2 6 Most Ohio cases have followed this
rationale and have held that the landlord is not liable, regardless of
whether the defect arose before or after the lease.27
'Kauffman v. First-Central Trust Co., 151 Ohio St. 298, 85 N.E.2d 796 (1949).
'Branham v. Fordyce, 103 Ohio App. 379 (1957); Stanforth v. Smith, 79 Ohio
App. 158, 71 N.E.2d 739 (1946); French v. Huston, 7 Ohio L.Abs. 55 (Ct. App.
1928); Hall v. Myers, 49 Ohio L.Abs. 345, 77 N.E.2d 81 (Munic. 1947). Contra,
Euphrat v. Kingsley, 5 Ohio L.Abs. 748 (Ct. App. 1927).
SGoodall v. Deters, 121 Ohio St. 432, 169 N.E. 443 (1929).
24Cooper v. Roose, 151 Ohio St. 316, 85 N.E.2d 545 (1949); Berkowitz v. Win-
ston, 128 Ohio St. 611, 193 N.E. 343 (1934).
'Cooper v. Roose, 151 Ohio St. 316, 85 N.E.2d 545 (1949).
"But see the definition of "control" in cases involving strangers, footnote 67, infra.
Cooper v. Roose, 151 Ohio St. 316, 85 N.E.2d 545 (1949); Berkowitz v. Winston,
128 Ohio St. 611, 193 N.E. 343 (1934); Branham v. Fordyce, 103 Ohio App. 379
(1957); Vecchiarelli v. Buchsieb, 62 Ohio L.Abs. 207, 107 N.E.2d 154 (Ct. App.
1950); Kline v. Rider, 48 Ohio L.Abs. 1, 73 N.E.2d 378 (Ct. App. 1947); Neff v.
Keepers, 58 Ohio App. 159, 16 N.E.2d 276 (1937); Himelreich v. Sams, 16 Ohio
L.Abs. 27 (Ct. App. 1933); Krug v. Link 8 Ohio L.Abs. 652 (Ct. App. 1930);
Poland v. Wuest, 36 Ohio App. 204, 172 N.E. 836 (1930); Pinchefsky v. Gold-
stone, 34 Ohio App. 306, 170 N.E. 657 (1929); Hollingsworth v. Mueller, 3 Ohio
L.Abs. 119 (Ct. App. 1924); Roberts v. Fulton, 24 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 233 (1916);
Mitchell v. Greiwe, 25 Ohio Dec. 670 (Super. 1913); Devanney v. Joering, 13 Ohio
Dec. 230 (Super. 1902); Ward v. Dan Cohen Realty Co., 30 Ohio Op. 469 (C.P.
1945); Herman v. Albers, 13 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 98 (C.P. 1912); Marlow v Shiff-
man, 9 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 533 (C.P. 1909), affd, 18 Ohio L.Rep. 209 (1911);
Hall v. Myers, 49 Ohio L.Abs. 345, 77 N.E.2d 81 (Munic. 1947).
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An exception to the rule of nonliability has been made wtih respect
to defects existing at the time of the lease if the evidence established that
the landlord was guilty of actual or constructive fraud. Ohio has had
only one case involving actual fraud - the landlord represented that
there was a candy factory on the adjoining premises, whereas the jury
found that he knew that it was really a torpedo factory.28 The court had
no difficulty in holding the landlord liable.
With respect -to constructive fraud, the Restatement of Torts takes
the position that,
A lessor of land, who conceals or fails to disclose to his lessee any
natural or artificial condition involving unreasonable risk of bodily harm
to persons upon the land, is subject to liability... if (a) the lessee does
not know of the condition or the risk involved therein, and (b) the lessor
knows of the condition and realizes the risk involved therein and has rea-
son to believe that the lessee will not discover the condition or realize the
risk.'
Unfortunately, the Ohio cases fail to come to such a dear conclusion.
The only Supreme Court case is an early one, and its holding is that the
landlord will be liable if he has knowledge of defects in the premises
which are not discoverable 'by ;the tenant upon practicable examination."
Such -rule is in keeping with the view of the Restatement, -but the lower
courts have not followed it universally. Most of the Ohio lower court
cases hold that the landlord will be liable only if he has actual knowl-
edge of the defect3 1 and the tenant does not have reason to know of it.
j 2
But a few cases have held that the landlord will be liable if he ought
to have known of the defect 3 and the tenant did not have actual knowl-
edge of it.
Three cases have formulated an exception to the rule of nonliabiity
for defects arising after the lease. The Cuyahoga County Court of Ap-
peals, in handling two cases of low-income tenants who rented the
'Brudno v. Miller, 22 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 471 (1907).
nRESTATEMENT, TORTS § 358 (1934).
' Shinkle, Wilson and Kreis Co. v. Birney, 68 Ohio St. 328, 67 N.E. 715 (1903).
'Marshman v. Stanley, 68 Ohio LAbs. 417, 122 N.E.2d 482 (Ct. App. 1952);
Bradner v. Kelly, 8 Ohio L.Abs. 69 (Ct. App. 1929); Mitchell v. Greiwe, 25 Ohio
Dec. 670 (Super. 1913); Herman v. Albers, 13 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 98 (C.P. 1912);
Jones v. Roberts, 1 Ohio Dec. 572 (C.P. 1894).
'Hoffhines v. Breen, 27 Ohio L-Abs. 290 (Ct. App. 1938); Bradner v. Kelly, 8
Ohio L.Abs. 69 (Ct. App. 1929); Herman v. Albers, 13 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 98 (C.P.
1912).
"Hoffhines v. Breen, 27 Ohio L.Abs. 290 (Ct. App. 1938); Krug v. Link, 8 Ohio
L.Abs. 652 (Ct. App. 1930); Pinchefsky v. Goldstone, 34 Ohio App. 306, 170 N.E.
657 (1929).
' Stanforth v. Smith, 79 Ohio App. 158, 71 N.E.2d 739 (1946); French v. Huston,
7 Ohio LAbs. 55 (Ct. App. 1928); Jones v. Roberts, 1 Ohio Dec. 572 (C.P. 1894).
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premises from month-to-month, allowed the tenants to recover tort
damages for breach of the landlord's promise to repair the premises.a5
A common pleas decision distinguished -between personal injuries and
property damage, recovery being allowed for the latter on the theory
that property damages were within the contemplation of the parties.3 6
No other Ohio cases have adopted these exceptions.
LIABILITY To TRESPASSERS AND LICENCEES
The Restatement of Torts makes no -provision for a landlord's liability
to trespassers, the trespasser being left to seek his remedy against the
person in possession and control of the premises. In Ohio's only tres-
passer case, the court held the landlord liable on a strained extension of
the agency theory.37 The landlord had told the tenant to keep boys from
'breaking down the fences, and the tenant shot one of the boys.
The Restatement attempts to place the licensee in the same position
as an invitee and hold the landlord liable for defects existing at the time
of the lease or arising later if the landlord has covenanted to keep
the premises in repair.38 The Ohio Supreme Court laid down a different
rule than the Restatement in the only case in which an Ohio court has
been called upon to decide the landlord's liability to licensees of the
-tenant. The court held that the landlord out of possession and control
will be liable to licensees only if the landlord knows of a dangerous
condition existing at the time of the lease and knows that the licensee
might reasonably be expected to encounter such danger in the exercise
of his license.3 9 The plaintiff in this case had been invited to the
defendant's fairgrounds, but it seems that he acquired the status of a
licensee when he wandered into a portion of the fairgrounds from which
invitees were excluded.
LIABILITY TO INVITEES
Under the broad heading of invitees are found cases dealing with busi-
ness invitees, social guests, employees of the tenant, and members of
the tenant's family. The Restatement of Torts takes the position that
the landlord will be liable to invitees for defects existing at the time of
'Union Trust Co. v. Johnson, 42 Ohio App. 301, 182 N.E. 137 (1931); Rutsky v.
Santa Lucia, 34 Ohio App. 317, 170 N.E. 599 (1929).
'Ward v. Dan Cohen Realty Co. 30 Ohio Op. 469 (C.P. 1945). Contra, Shinkle,
Wilson and Kreis Co. v. Birney, 68 Ohio St. 328, 67 N.E. 715 (1903).
mHanslip v. Hammer, 40 Ohio App. 178, 178 N.E. 19 (1931).
'RESTATBmENT, TORTS , 357 (1934).
'Stark County Agricultural Society v. Brenner, 122 Ohio St. 560, 172 N.E. 659
(1930).
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the lease or for defects arising later if the landlord has covenanted to
keep the premises in repair.40  The Ohio courts have taken a contrary
stand in at least -the latter situation; they have held that the landlord is
not liable for a defect arising after the making of the lease, despite the
fact that he has contracted to keep the premises in repair.41  Four cases
might be said to be in conflict with the preceding rule because, while
the landlord was held not to be liable, the courts indicated that they
might have found liability if there had been covenants -by the landlord
to keep the premises in repair.4
A recent appellate case is troublesome because the court does not
indicate the status of the plaintfff.43 If the plaintiff was a stranger, the
correct rule was used,4 4 but if the plaintiff was an invitee, the holding
is to the effect that the landlord's agreement to keep an air compressor in
repair is sufficient evidence to find that he had control of the compressor.
While this later interpretation finds support in the Restatement,45 it is
novel to Ohio law.
Clearly, -the landlord will be liable to the tenant's invitees for defects
existing at the time of the lease if he has been -guilty of actual or con-
structive fraud. Ohio's only two cases involving invitees have stated
that the landlord must have actual knowledge of the defect to 'be held
liable,46 otherwise the rules of the "tenane' cases47 are probably appli-
cable.
RsTATmENT, TORTS § 357 (1934).
"Pitts v. Cincinnati Metropolitan Housing Authority, 160 Ohio St. 129, 113 N.E.2d
869 (1953); Brown v. Cleveland Baseball Co., 158 Ohio St. 1, 106 N.E.2d 632
(1952); Sinton v. Butler, 40 Ohio St. 158 (1883); Burdick v. Cheadle, 26 Ohio
St. 393 (1875); Trinity Universal Insurance Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 73 Ohio L.Abs.
114, 136 N.E.2d 279 (Ct. App. 1955); Chupek v. Akron, 89 Ohio App. 266, 101
N.E.2d 245 (1951); Bevan v. Century Realty Co., 64 Ohio App. 58, 27 N.E.2d
777 (1940); Ford v. Eisenberger, 29 Ohio LAbs. 277 (Ct. App. 1939); Land v.
Brotherhood, 21 Ohio L.Abs. 462 (Ct. App. 1936); Minneker v. Gardiner, 47
Ohio App. 203, 191 N.E. 793 (1933); Ewing v. Webb, 13 Ohio L.Abs. 162 (Ct.
App. 1932); Kasunic v. Euclid East Seventeenth Street Co., 32 Ohio L.Rep. 261
(Ct. App. 1929); Ward v. Dan Cohen Realty Co., 30 Ohio Op. 469 (C.P. 1945);
Schradski v. Butler, 22 Ohio Dec. 701 (C.P. 1911).
'"Kauffman v. First Central Trust Co., 151 Ohio St. 298, 85 N.E.2d 796 (1949);
Shindelbeck v. Moon, 32 Ohio St. 264 (1877); Flynn v. Wiltshire, 19 Ohio C.C.R.
(n.s.) 433 (1912); McNeal v. Emery's Sons, 8 Ohio Dec. Reprint 513 (Dist.
1882).
Taylor v. Standard Oil Co., 71 Ohio L.Abs. 75, 130 N.E.2d 391 (Ct. App. 1954).
Gaug v. Monroeville Oil Co., 35403, has been certified to the supreme court by the
Huron County Court of Appeals as being in conflict with the Taylor case.
" See footnote 67, infra.
'15RBsTATEMBNT, TORTS 5 357 (1934).
"Dyer v. Robinson, 110 Fed. 99 (S.D. Ohio 1899); Bradner v. Kelly, 8 Ohio
LAbs. 69 (Ct. App. 1929).
'7 See footnotes 30-34, supra.
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In the absence of fraud, the cases are in conflict as to the landlord's
liabilty for defects existing at the time of the lease. The leading Ohio
case in this area is Burdick v. Cheadle.48 The landlord was in the process
of constructing shelving for a storeroom when he leased the premises to
a tenant, the construction being completed after the lease was made.
Thus, the defect may have arisen before or after the lease.49 The court
held that it was immaterial when the shelving became defective because
the landlord would not be liable in either case.
The holding of the Burdick case was beclouded two years later
by dicta in the case of Shindelbeck v. Moon.50 Faced with a defect
which arose after the lease, the Supreme Court enunciated the rule that
a landlord out of possession and control, who can't even enter to make
repairs without the tenant's consent, is not liable unless the defect arose
before the lease. This dicta has been followed in two appellate cases,51
and it is the basis for two Supreme Court cases wherein the landlord re-
served the right to direct and supervise the making of repairs.5 2  This
line of cases does not appear to be the better view, and their holdings
have not been followed by the great majority of Ohio cases, the rule of
the Burdick case being adopted instead.53 Unlike the stranger who has
an independent status, the invitee can only claim through the person who
invited him to the premises. If the tenant has no cause of action against
the landlord, neither should the invitee of the tenant.
Many states have given the invitee an independent status, and thus
permitted him to sue the landlord, if the premises were leased to the
tenant so that he might invite large numbers of the public to the
premises. This "public use" doctrine was enunciated in the New York
' 26 Ohio St. 393 (1875).
" Although the opinion clearly indicates that the court is not sure just when the de-
fect arose, the syllabus states that the defect arose after the lease was made.
' 32 Ohio St. 264 (1877).
' R.K.O. Midwest Corp. v. Berling, 51 Ohio App. 85, 199 N.E. 604 (1935); Flynn
v. Wiltshire, 19 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 433 (1912). Edwards v. Rissler, 5 Ohio C.C.R.
(n.s.) 44 (1902) really involved a part of the premises used in common, but the
court stated as an alternate ground of decision that the landlord would be liable for
a defect inherent in the original construction.
" In Stackhouse v. Close, 83 Ohio St. 339, 94 N.E. 746 (1911), the alternate ground
of decision was violation of a statute. The court did adopt the rule in Witherspoon
v. Haft, 157 Ohio St. 474, 106 N.E.2d 296 (1952), but it seems better to justify
holding the landlord liable on the ground that the tenant had been in possession
too short a time to discover the defect.
' Schwalbach v. Shinkle, Wilson & Kreis Co., 97 Fed. 483 (S.D. Ohio 1899);
Ripple v. Mahoning National Bank, 143 Ohio St. 614, 56 N.E.2d 289 (1944);
Berkowitz v. Winston, 128 Ohio St. 611, 193 N.E. 343 (1934); Marqua v. Martin,
109 Ohio St. 56, 141 N.E. 654 (1923); Lee v. Smith, 42 Ohio St. 458 (1884);
Sinton v. Butler, 40 Ohio St. 158 (1883); Vecchiarelli v. Buchsieb, 62 Ohio L.Abs.
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case of Swords v. Edgar when the court stated that the intestate's use of
the pier was under a claim of right because the pier was in actuality an
extension of the public highway.54 Subsequent cases have applied the
rule to amusement parks,5 theaters, 56 sporting events,57 and similar
places where the public congregates in large numbers. This view has
also been adopted by the Restatement of Torts.58 The Ohio courts have
not yet ruled on this "public use" doctrine, although the opportunity has
been presented.59 Since such semi-public places are, for all intents and
purposes, like the -public sidewalk adjoining leased premises, it is sub-
mitted that the "public use" doctrine should be adopted -by the Ohio
courts. The invitee thus takes on the independent status of a stranger
and should be governed by the same rules of liability.
Some courts have formulated an "extended public use" rule which
renders the landlord liable to invitees of the tenant even if small num-
bers of the public are to -be admitted to the premises. 60  While the
207, 107 N.E.2d 154 (Ct. App. 1950); Bevan v. Century Realty Co., 64 Ohio App.
58, 27 N.E.2d 777 (1940); Carr v. Fox, 32 Ohio L.Abs. 103, 31 N.E.2d 713 (Ct.
App. 1940); Harrison v. Struich, 19 Ohio L.Abs. 374 (Ct. App. 1935); Minneker
v. Gardiner, 47 Ohio App. 203, 191 N.E. 793 (1933); Wilson v. Saalfield, 45
Ohio App. 484, 187 N.E. 323 (1933); Mouliet v. Anderson, 13 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.)
404 (1907). Ziegler v. Rice, 14 Ohio L-Abs. 570 (Ct. App. 1933) also reached
this result, but it was reversed in 128 Ohio St. 239, 190 N.E. 560 (1934) because
the Supreme Court found that a "common hallway" situation existed.
"59 N.Y. 28, 32 (1874).
'Albert v. State, 66 Md. 325, 7 Atl. 697 (1886); Martin v. Asbury Park, 111
N.J.L. 364, 168 Ad. 612 (1933); Barrett v. Lake Ontario Beach Imp. Co., 174
N.Y. 310, 66 N.E. 968 (1903); Joyce v. Martin, 15 R.I. 558, 10 Atl. 620 (1887);
Larson v. Calder's Park Co., 54 Utah 325, 180 Pac. 599 (1919).
ALang v. Stadium Purchasing Corp., 216 App. Div. 558, 215 N.Y. Supp. 502
(1926).
" Folkman v. Lauer, 244 Pa. 605, 91 Ad. 218 (1914).
r8RESTATEMENT, ToRTs § 359 (1934).
'In Brown v. Cleveland Baseball Co., 158 Ohio St. 1, 106 N.E.2d 632 (1952),
stands collapsed at a football game; the landlord was held liable because he had
really not surrendered control to the tenant. With similar facts in Witherspoon v.
Haft, 157 Ohio St. 474, 106 N.E.2d 296 (1952), the court chose to base liability
on the fact that the landlord supervised and controlled the erection of the bleachers.
The landlord has also been held liable on the theory that the tenant was in possession
an insufficient time to discover and repair the defects, e.g., a one or a two day lease.
DiRenzo v. Cavalier, 165 Ohio St. 386, 135 N.E.2d 394 (1956); Carr v. Fox, 32
Ohio LAbs. 103, 31 N.E.2d 713 (Ct. App. 1940).
' Gilligan v. Blakesley, 93 Colo. 370, 26 P.2d 808 (1933) (doctor's office); Webel
v. Yale University, 125 Conn. 515, 7 A.2d 215 (1939) (beauty shop); Stenberg v.
Wilcox, 96 Tenn. 163, 33 S.W. 917 (1896) (boarding house). But other courts
have repudiated such an extension and refused to hold the landlord liable; Warner
v. Fry, 360 Mo. 496, 228 S.W.2d 729 (1950) (neighborhood tavern); Clark v.
Chase Hotel Co., 230 Mo. App. 739, 74 S.W.2d 498 (1934) (turkish bath); Marx
v. Standard Oil Co., 6 N.J.Super. 39, 69 A.2d 748 (1949) (gas station); Hayden
19581
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
"public use" rule itself may be justified on grounds of public policy, the
extension of it literally destroys, the well-established and logical rules
discussed earlier in this section. No Ohio courts have adopted this ex-
tended theory.
LIABILiTy TO STRANGERS
When the injured party is not on the premises at the time of his
injury, the courts understandably apply a stricter standard of liability.
The usual case involves a pedestrian on the public sidewalk who is in-
jured -by a falling object or trips over a defect in the sidewalk. Though
the landlord is out of possession and control, he will be liable if a
nuisance existed on the premises at the time of the lease, whether he
knew of the nuisance or not.61 However, if the plaintiff fails to prove
that the defect constituted a nuisance or that it existed at the time of
the lease, a verdict must be directed for the landlord.62  The statement
has been made that the landlord might also be liable if a nuisance were
certain to arise from the normal use of the premises or if the landlord
knew the tenant would negligently create a nuisance,63 and one appellate
case seems to have used this theory to hold the landlord liable. 4
The leading case on the subject of defects arising during the lease is
that of Appel v. Muller;65 the court reasoned that the landlord has a
basic duty to keep the premises safe for strangers, and when he cove-
nants with the tenant to keep the premises in repair, he retains sufficient
power to perform that duty. Ohio indicated at an early date that it
would follow such a rule when, in dicta, the Supreme Court stated that
a covenant to repair would be a sufficient retention of control to render
the landlord liable to strangers.66 The precise facts have been before the
v. Second Nat. Bank, 331 Pa. 29, 199 At. 218 (1938) (public garage); Gentry v.
Taylor, 182 Tenn. 223, 185 S.W.2d 521 (1945) (restaurant in amusement park).
"Little Miami R.R. v. Hambleton, 40 Ohio St. 496 (1884); Coward v. Fleming,
89 Ohio App. 485, 102 N.E.2d 850 (1951); Dodson v. New England Trust Co.,
78 Ohio App. 503, 71 N.E.2d 503 (1946); Scherman v. Allard, 19 Ohio App. 374
(1923); Debar v. Walsh, 11 Ohio App. 75 (1919); Williams v. Macready & Co.,
7 Ohio Dec. Reprint 381 (Dist. 1877); Mcllvaine v. Wood, 12 Ohio Dec. Reprint
384 (Gen. Term 1856). Eldredge, Landlord's Tort Liability, 84 U. PA. L Rnv. 467
(1936); 37 KY. L.J. 322 (1948-49); 7 N.Y.U. INTRA. L. RBV. 131 (1951-52).
'Prendergast v. Ginsburg, 119 Ohio St. 360, 164 N.E. 345 (1928); Hess v. Devou,
112 Ohio St. 1, 146 N.E. 311 (1925); Smith v. Miller, 11 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 577
(1909).
' Langabaugh v. Anderson, 68 Ohio St. 131, 67 N.E. 286 (1903).
"In Mayer v. Brudno, 16 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 102 (1909), the tenant used the
premises for a torpedo factory.
-262 N.Y. 278, 186 N.E. 785 (1933).
'Burdick v. Cheadle, 26 Ohio St. 393 (1875).
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Ohio courts only twice,67 but the cases have dearly established that,
unlike the meaning of "control" in the tenant and invitee situations,6
"contror is now equated with a covenant to repair. On the other hand,
when the landlord has not covenanted to keep the premises in repair,
Ohio courts refuse to hold him liable for defects occurring after the
lease.6 9
CONCLUSION
The landlord will -be liable to his tenant only if he is guilty of actual
or constructive fraud in concealing a defect which existed at the time of
the lease. In all other cases involving tenants, the better rule is that
the landlord is not liable, despite the fact that he has covenanted to re-
pair. The same rule is generally used in invitee situations, although
there have been strong cross-currents. Since the invitee can only claim
through the tenant, it would appear better to say that he has no better
right against the landlord than the tenant would have. A worth-while
exception has been carved out of the rule of nonliability if the premises
are leased for the admission of large numbers of the public, but the at-
tempt of some courts to extend this doctrine to places where small num-
bers of the public are admitted seems erroneous. If the plaintiff is a
stranger, the landlord will be liable for a nuisance which existed on
the premises at the time of the lease, and if he has covenanted to repair,
he will also be liable for a defect which arose during the lease.
Regardless of the status of the plaintiff, the landlord may be liable if
the injury takes place on a portion of the premises which is used in
common by two or more tenants. The age-old distinction between non-
feasance and misfeasance still exists in the cases, so the landlord who
gratuitously makes repairs in a negligent manner will render himself
liable to whomever is injured -by his faulty workmanship. Cutting across
all these rules of liability and nonliabiity is the power of the legislature
to create new liabilities or eradicate old ones.
A landlord cannot very well escape liability for defects existing at
the time of the lease. But he can minimize the possibility of being found
liable for a defect arising during the lease if he does not covenant to
'Friedl v. Lackman, 136 Ohio St. 110, 23 N.E.2d 950 (1939); Williams v.
Macready & Co., 7 Ohio Dec. Reprint 381 (Dist. 1877).
' See foomotes 25 and 41, supra.
'Prendergast v. Ginsburg, 119 Ohio St. 360, 164 N.E. 345 (1928); Hess v. Devou,
112 Ohio St. 1, 146 N.E. 311 (1925); Langabaugh v. Anderson, 68 Ohio St. 131,
67 N.E. 286 (1903); Youngstown v. Peters, 60 Ohio App. 247, 20 N.E.2d 538
(1937); Poland v. Wuest, 36 Ohio App. 204. 172 N.E. 836 (1930); Amazon
Lodge v. Krempin, 5 Ohio LAbs. 7 (Ct. App. 1926); Smith v. Miller 11 Ohio
CC.R. (n.s.) 577 (1909).
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